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ABSTRACT
The ongoing concern about systemic risk since the outburst
of the global financial crisis has highlighted the need for
risk measures at the level of sets of interconnected financial
components, such as portfolios, institutions or members of
clearing houses. The two main issues in systemic risk mea-
surement are the computation of an overall reserve level
and its allocation to the different components according to
their systemic relevance. We develop here a pragmatic ap-
proach to systemic risk measurement and allocation based
on multivariate shortfall risk measures, where acceptable
allocations are first computed and then aggregated so as to
minimize costs. We analyze the sensitivity of the risk allo-
cations to various factors and highlight its relevance as an
indicator of systemic risk. In particular, we study the inter-
play between the loss function and the dependence struc-
ture of the components. Moreover, we address the compu-
tational aspects of risk allocation. Finally, we apply this
methodology to the allocation of the default fund of a CCP
on real data.
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1. Introduction
The ongoing concern about systemic risk since the onset of the global financial crisis has prompted
intensive research on the design and properties of multivariate risk measures. In this paper, we study
the risk assessment for financial systems with interconnected risky components, focusing on two major
aspects, namely:
• The quantification of a monetary risk measure corresponding to an overall reserve of liquidity such
that the whole system can overcome unexpected stress or default scenarios;
• The allocation of this overall amount between the different risk components in a way that reflects
the systemic risk of each one.
Our goal is fourfold. First, we introduce a theoretically sound but numerically tractable class of systemic
risk measures. Second, we study the impact of the intrinsic dependence on the risk allocation and it
sensitivity. Third, we address the computational aspect and challenges of systemic risk allocation. Finally,
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we present empirical results, based on real data provided by LCH S.A., on the risk allocation of the default
fund of a CCP.
Review of the Literature: Monetary risk measures have been the subject of intensive research since the
seminal paper of Artzner et al. [6], which was further extended by Föllmer and Schied [31] and Frittelli
and Rosazza Gianin [32], among others. The corresponding risk measures, including conditional value-
at-risk by Artzner et al. [6], shortfall risk measures by Föllmer and Schied [31] or optimized certainty
equivalents by Ben-Tal and Teboulle [9], can be applied in a multivariate framework that models the
dependence of several financial risk components. Multivariate market data-based risk measures include
the marginal expected shortfall of Acharya et al. [1], law invariant convex risk measures for portfolio
vectors of Rüschendorf [45], the systemic risk measure of Acharya et al. [2] and Brownlees and Engle
[13], the delta conditional value-at-risk of Adrian and Brunnermeier [3] or the contagion index of Cont
et al. [20]. In parallel, theoretical economical and mathematical considerations have led to multivalued
and set-valued risk measures, in static or even dynamic setup; see for instance Cascos and Molchanov
[15], Hamel et al. [36] and Jouini et al. [37].
Recently, the risk management of financial institutions raised concerns about the allocation of the
overall risk among the different components of a financial system. A bank, for instance, for real time
monitoring purposes, wants to channel to each trading desk a cost reflecting its responsibility in the
overall capital requirement of the bank. A central clearing counterparty — CCP for short, also known
as a clearing house — is interested in quantifying the size of the so-called default fund and allocating
it in a meaningful way among the different clearing members, see [5, 19, 34]. On a macroeconomic
level, regulators are considering to require from financial institutions an amount of capital reflecting their
systemic relevance. The aforementioned approaches can only address the allocation problem indirectly,
through the sensitivity of the risk measure with respect to the different risk components. For instance,
the so-called Euler rule allocates the total amount of risk according to the marginal impact of each risk
factor. However, a practical limitation of the Euler rule is that it is based on Gâteaux derivatives which
in general is difficult to compute beyond simple cases. Also this Euler rule consider the marginal risk of
one element with respect to the full system rather than the marginal risk with respect to each individual
components. In addition, the Euler risk allocation does not add up to the total risk, unless the univariate
risk measure that is used in the first place is sub-additive, see [46]. In other words, the Euler rule does
not automatically fulfill the so-called full allocation property. The work by Brunnemeier and Cheridito
[14] addresses systematically the question of allocation of systemic risk with regard to certain economic
properties:
• Full allocation: the sum of the components of the risk allocation is equal to the overall risk measure;
• Riskless allocation: if a risk factor is riskless, the corresponding component of the risk allocation
is equal to it;
• Causal responsibility: any system component bears the entire additional costs of any additional risk
that it takes.
More specifically, Brunnemeier and Cheridito [14] propose a framework where an overall capital require-
ment is first determined by utility indifference principles and then allocated according to a rule such that
the above three properties are fulfilled, at least at a first order level of approximation. In fact, as far as de-
pendence is concerned, whether the last two properties should hold is debatable. One may argue that each
component in the system is not only responsible for its own risk taking but also for its relative exposure
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to other components. This is also what comes out from the present study, see Section 4.3. In a general
framework, Kromer et al. [39] characterized systemic risk out of axioms allowing for a decomposition
between and aggregation function and a univariate risk measure. In the spirit of this aggregation function,
in two recent papers, Feinstein et al. [28] and Biagini et al. [10] proposed a general approach similar in
spirit to ours. We precise thereafter and later in the paper the relationship to these references and in which
sense our take on differs.
Contribution and Outline of the Paper: Our approach addresses simultaneously the design of an
overall risk measure regarding a financial system of interconnected components and the allocation of this
risk measure among the different risk components; the emphasis lies on the allocation and its sensitiv-
ities. In contrast to [14, 16], we first allocate the monetary risk among the different risk components
and then aggregate and minimizes the risk allocations in order to obtain the overall capital requirement.
As previously mentioned, [39], [28] and [10] develop approaches in a similar spirit, covering allocation
first followed by aggregation, in general frameworks with different aggregation procedures. They focus
on the resulting risk measure, conducting systematic studies of their properties in terms of set valued
functions, diversification and monotonicity, among others. The multivariate shortfall risk measure of this
paper can be viewed as a special case of their definition, in a way precised in Remark 2.10. Sharing with
these references the “allocate first, then aggregate” perspective, our approach is restricted to a systemic
extension of shortfall risk measures, see [31], based on multivariate loss functions. However, in contrast
to the aforementioned references, we focus on the resulting risk allocation in terms of existence, unique-
ness, sensitivities and numerical applications. In our framework, the systemic risk is the risk that stems
specifically from the intrinsic dependence structure of an interconnected system of risk components. In
this perspective, the risk allocation and its properties provide a “cartography” of the systemic risk, see
Section 5 on the numerical aspects of risk allocation and the empirical study in Section 6 on real data
for an illustration thereof. It turns out that special care has to be given to the specifications of the loss
function in order to stress the systemic risk. In [10], by allowing random allocations, the impact of the
interdependence structure can be observed in the future. Such random allocations may be interesting in
view of a posterior management of defaults. By contrast, our deterministic allocation is sensitive to the
dependence of the system already at the moment of the quantification, see Section 4 and see a contrario
Proposition 3.9. We study the sensitivity of the risk allocation with respect to external shocks as well
as internal dependence structure. We show in particular that a causal responsibility can be derived in
marginal terms, see Proposition 4.3. In addition, we discuss computational aspects of risk allocation and
finally, we provide an empirical study on the risk allocation of a default fund of a CCP based on real data
provided by LCH S.A.
The univariate shortfall risk measure as a law invariant risk measure holds additional properties as an
operator on probability distributions. Indeed, as studied by Weber [47] and Krätschmer et al. [38], it has
some continuity properties with respect to the ψ-weak topology on distributions. It has been furthermore
characterised in [47] as the only convex law invariant convex risk measure on the level of distributions
and therefore the unique one having elicitability properties, a wishful statistical property, see [8, 41].
Extensions of these results, such as elicitability characterization in multidimensional case as proposed
by Ziegel [48] and Fissler and Ziegel [30], as well as the axiomatic characterization along the lines of
[47], are highly non trivial and therefore let for further study. A set-valued multivariate shortfall risk
measure has been introduced by Ararat et al. [4]. However, allocation is the not focus of their work and
the loss function that they then consider is decoupled in the sense of (C2), which from our viewpoint is
too restrictive in view of Proposition 3.9.
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The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the class of systemic loss functions, acceptance
sets and risk measures that we use in the paper. Section 3 establishes the existence and uniqueness of a risk
allocation. Section 4 focuses on sensitivities with respect to external shocks, dependence structure, nature
of the loss function as well as the properties of full allocation, causal responsibility and riskless allocation
mentioned beforehand. Section 5 discusses the computational aspects and challenges of risk allocation.
Section 6, applies our approach to the concrete allocation of the default fund of a CCP. Appendices A and
B gather classical facts from convex optimization and results on multivariate Orlicz spaces. Appendix C
provides additional insight on the data of the empirical study.
1.1. Basic Notation
Let xk denote the generic coordinate of a vector x ∈ Rd, and ek the k-th unit vector. By > we denote
the lattice order on Rd, that is, x > y if and only if xk ≥ yk for every 1 ≤ k ≤ d. We denote by ‖·‖
the Euclidean norm and by ±,∧,∨, |·| the lattice operations on Rd. For x, y ∈ Rd, we write x > y for
xk > yk componentwise, x · y =
∑
xkyk, xy = (x1y1, . . . , xdyd) and x/y = (x1/y1, . . . , xd/yd). We
denote by f∗(y) = supx{x · y − f(x)} the convex conjugate of a function f : Rd → [−∞,∞], and for
C ⊆ Rd, we denote by δ(·|C) the indicator function of C being equal to 0 on C and∞ otherwise.
Let (Ω,F , P ) be a probability space, and denote by L0(Rd) the space of F-measurable d-variate
random variables on this space identified in the P -almost sure sense. The space L0(Rd) inherits the
lattice structure of Rd, hence we can use the above notation in a P -almost sure sense. For instance, for
X and Y in L0(Rd), we say that X > Y or X > Y if P [X > Y ] = 1 or P [X > Y ] = 1, respectively.
Since we mainly deal with multivariate functions or random variables, to simplify notation we drop the
reference to Rd in L0(Rd), writing simply L0 unless necessary.
2. Multivariate Shortfall Risk
Let X = (X1, . . . , Xd) ∈ L0 be a random vector of financial losses, that is, negative values of Xk
represent actual profits. We want to determine an overall monetary measureR(X) of the risk ofX as well
as a sound risk allocation RAk(X), k = 1, . . . , d, of R(X) among the d risk components. We consider
a flexible class of risk measures defined by means of loss functions and sets of acceptable monetary
allocations. This class allows us to discuss in detail the properties of the resulting risk allocation as an
indicator of systemic risk. Inspired by the shortfall risk measure introduced in [31] in the univariate case,
we start with a loss function ` defined on Rd, used to measure the expected loss E[`(X)] of the financial
loss vector X .
Definition 2.1. A function ` : Rd → (−∞,∞] is called a loss function if
(A1) ` is increasing, that is, `(x) ≥ `(y) if x > y;
(A2) ` is convex, lower semi-continuous with inf ` < 0;
(A3) `(x) ≥∑xk − c for some constant c.
A loss function ` is permutation invariant if `(x) = `(pi(x)) for every permutation pi of the components.
A risk neutral assessment of the losses corresponds to E[
∑
Xk] =
∑
E[Xk]. Thus, (A3) expresses a
form of risk aversion, whereby the loss function puts more weight on high losses than a risk neutral
evaluation. As for (A1) and (A2), they express the respective normative facts about risk that “the more
losses, the riskier” and “diversification should not increase risk”; see [22] for related discussions.
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Remark 2.2. The choice of the terminology “loss function” stems from [31] for which this paper is a
multivariate extension. Our notion of a loss function coincide with the one of “aggregation function” in
[10, 28], in the sense that it aggregate several loss profiles into a univariate random variable for which it
can be decided whether or not it is acceptable, see Remark 2.10. Due to the obvious extension from the
shortfall risk measure, throughout this paper we stick to the terminology “loss function”.
As for the permutation invariance, the considered risk components are often of the same type — banks,
members of a clearing house or trading desks within a trading floor. In that case, the loss function should
not discriminate a particular component against another. 
Example 2.3. Let h : R→ R be a one-dimensional loss function such as for instance
h(x) = x+ − βx−, 0 ≤ β < 1, h(x) = x+ (x+)2/2 or h(x) = ex − 1.
Using these as building blocks, we obtain the following classes of multivariate loss functions, which will
be used for illustrative purposes in the discussion of systemic risk, see Section 3 and 4.
(C1) `(x) = h(
∑
xk);
(C2) `(x) =
∑
h(xk);
(C3) `(x) = αh(
∑
xk) + β
∑
h(xk), where α, β ≥ 0 non both zero.
Note that each of these loss functions are permutation invariant. ♦
For integrability reasons we consider loss vectors in the following multivariate Orlicz heart:1
Mθ =
{
X ∈ L0 : E [θ (λX)] <∞ for all λ ∈ R+
}
,
where θ(x) = `(|x|), x ∈ Rd; see Appendix B.
Remark 2.4.
Definition 2.5. A monetary allocation m ∈ Rd is acceptable for X if
E [` (X −m)] ≤ 0.
We denote by
A(X) :=
{
m ∈ Rd : E [` (X −m)] ≤ 0} (2.1)
the corresponding set of acceptable monetary allocations.
Example 2.6. In a centrally cleared trading setup, each clearing member k is required to post a default
fund contribution mk in order to make the risk of the clearing house acceptable with respect to a risk
measure accounting for extreme and systemic risk. The default fund is a pooled resource of the clearing
house, in the sense that the default fund contribution of a given member can be used by the clearing
house not only in case the liquidation of this member requires it, but also in case the liquidation of
another member requires it. For the determination of the default fund contributions, the methodology
of this paper can be applied to the vector X defined as the vector of stressed losses-and-profits of the
clearing members. According to the findings of Section 3 and 4, a “systemic” loss function such as (C3)
1Orlicz spaces are natural spaces in this context. The theory of Orlicz spaces has been used for long in the theory of risk measures,
see [11, 12, 18, 21].
5
with α > 0 would be consistent with the purpose of a default fund. Note however that our setup applied
to clearing houses takes the view of a closed system, so an internal assessment. In principle we ignore
additional systemic risk such as a competition between clearing houses with common membership, or
the external risk to which these members may be subject to, as addressed for instance in [35]. However,
our method could also assess such a systemic risk by taking X as the overall vector of positions of each
member in each clearing house. ♦
The next proposition gathers the main properties of the sets of acceptable monetary allocations. The
convexity property in (i) means that a diversification between two acceptable monetary allocations re-
mains acceptable. If a monetary allocation is acceptable, then any greater amount of money should also
be acceptable, which is the monotonicity property in (i). As for (ii), it says that, if the losses X are less
than Y almost surely, then any monetary allocation that is acceptable for Y is also forX . Next, (iii) means
that a convex combination of allocations acceptable in two markets is still acceptable in the diversified
market. In particular, the acceptability concept pushes towards a greater diversification among the dif-
ferent risk components. From the viewpoint of a clearing house for instance, a diversified position of its
members is preferable to a concentrated one and therefore may enforce default fund allocations that incite
its members towards this goal. Also, from a trading floor supervision, an overall diversified position of
the traders is preferable, an incentive which is a current practice, see example 5.2. Finally, (iv) means that
acceptable positions translate with cash in the sense of scalar monetary risk measures à la [6, 31, 32]. As
an immediate consequence of these properties, X 7→ A(X) defines a monetary set-valued risk measure
in the sense of [36], that is, a set-valued map A from Mθ into the set of monotone, closed and convex
subsets of Rd.
Proposition 2.7. For X,Y in Mθ, it holds:
(i) A(X) is convex, monotone and closed;
(ii) A(X) ⊇ A(Y ) whenever X 6 Y ;
(iii) A(αX + (1− α)Y ) ⊇ αA(X) + (1− α)A(Y ), for any α ∈ (0, 1);
(iv) A(X +m) = A(X) +m, for any m ∈ Rd;
(v) ∅ 6= A(X) 6= Rd.
If furthermore
(vi) ` is positive homogeneous, then A(λX) = λA(X) for every λ > 0;
(vii) ` is permutation invariant, then A(pi(X)) = pi(A(X)) for every permutation pi;
Proof. Since ` is convex, increasing and lower semi-continuous, it follows that (m,X) 7→ E[`(X −m)]
is convex and lower semi-continuous, decreasing in m and increasing in X . This implies the properties
(i) through (iii) by Definition 2.5 of A(X). Regarding (iv), a change of variables yields
A(X +m) =
{
n ∈ Rd : E [` (X +m− n) ≤ 0]} = {n+m ∈ Rd : E [` (X − n)] ≤ 0} = A(X) +m.
As for (v), on the one hand, `(X −m) ↘ `(−∞) < 0 as m → ∞ component-wise. Since X ∈ Mθ it
follows that `(X) ∈ L1, thus monotone convergence yields E[`(X −m)] ↘ `(−∞) < 0 and in turns
the existence of m ∈ Rd such that E[`(X − m)] ≤ 0, showing that A(X) 6= ∅. On the other hand, `
being increasing and such that `(x) ≥∑xk − c, it implies that `(X −m) ≥∑Xk −∑mk − c↗∞
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as m→ −∞, component-wise. Hence, monotone convergence yields E[`(X−m)]↗∞ > 0, therefore
there exists m ∈ Rd such that E[`(X − m)] > 0, that is, m 6∈ A(X). As for (vi), if ` is positive
homogeneous, for any λ > 0 it holds E[`(λX − m)] = λE[`(X − m/λ)]. Hence m is in A(λX) if
and only if m/λ is in A(X) if and only if m is in λA(X). Finally, if ` is permutation invariant, for any
permutation pi it holds E[`(pi(X)−m)] = E[`(pi(X − pi−1(m))] = E[`(X − pi−1(m))]. Hence m is in
A(pi(X)) if and only if pi−1(m) is in A(X), if and only if m is in pi(A(X)) showing (vii). 
Figure 1 shows sets of acceptable monetary allocations for a bivariate normal distribution with varying
correlation coefficient. The location and shape of these sets change with the correlation: the higher the
correlation, the more costly the acceptable monetary allocations, as expected in terms of systemic risk.
As discussed in Sections 3 and 4, this feature is not always immediate and depends on the specification
of the loss function.
Figure 1: Acceptance setsA(X) corresponding to the case study of Section 3.13 for different correlations.
Given an acceptable monetary allocation m ∈ A(X), its aggregated liquidity cost is ∑mk. The
smaller the cost, the better, which motivates the following definition.
Definition 2.8. The multivariate shortfall risk of X ∈Mθ is
R(X) := inf
{∑
mk : m ∈ A(X)
}
= inf
{∑
mk : E [` (X −m)] ≤ 0
}
. (2.2)
Example 2.9. Following up on the central clearing house Example 2.6, any acceptable allocation m ∈
A(X) yields a corresponding value for the default fund. Clearing houses are in competition with each
other, hence they are looking for the cheapest acceptable allocation to require from their members. ♦
Remark 2.10. When d = 1, the above definition corresponds exactly to the shortfall risk measure in [31],
of which this paper is a multivariate extension.
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The set valued risk measureX 7→ A(X) introduced in (2.1) can be seen as an example of the set valued
systemic risk measures presented in [28], which in their notation translates as follows
A(X) = R(Y, k) =
{
m ∈ Rd : Yk+m ∈ A
}
where the aggregation is given by Yk+m = Λ(X − k −m) for Λ(x) = `(x) and the acceptance set is
A := {X : E[X] ≤ 0}. Their setting considers more general random fields Yk associated with capital
allocations denoted by k accommodating for instance the modelling of financial networks, among others.
The case we consider can be embedded into [28, Case (ii), Page 5]. Even if set valued risk measure is not
the primary focus of [10], it is included in the definition of the acceptance family which, in their notation,
is given as follows
Am = AY = {X : E [`(X −m)] ≤ 0} , Y ∈ C
where C = Rd and Y = Rd. The resulting systemic risk measure can also be translated in their notation
and denomination in terms of an aggregating function Λ(x) = `(x), acceptance setA = {X : E[X] ≤ 0}
and a measure of risk pi(m) =
∑
mk, resulting into
R(X) = inf {pi(m) : Λ(X −m) ∈ A} .
Therefore the case we consider can be embedded into the class presented in [10, Section 1.3]. 
Our next result, which uses the concepts and notation of Appendix B, shows that all the classical prop-
erties of the shortfall risk measure, including its dual representation, can be extended to the multivariate
case. We denote by
Qθ∗ :=
{
dQ
dP
:= (Z1, . . . , Zd) : Z ∈ Lθ∗ , Z > 0 and such that E [1 · Z] = E
[∑
Zk
]
= 1
}
the set of d-dimensional measure densities in Lθ
∗
normalized to E[1 · Z] = 1. For the sake of simplicity,
we use the notation EQ[X] := E[dQ/dP ·X] for dQ/dP ∈ Qθ∗ and X ∈Mθ.
Theorem 2.11. The function
R(X) = inf
{∑
mk : m ∈ A(X)
}
, X ∈Mθ,
is real valued, convex, monotone and translation invariant.2 In particular, it is continuous and sub-
differentiable. If ` is positive homogeneous, then so is R. Moreover, it admits the dual representation
R(X) = max
Q∈Qθ∗
{EQ [X]− α(Q)} , X ∈Mθ, (2.3)
where the penalty function is given by
α(Q) = inf
λ>0
E
[
λ`∗
(
dQ
λdP
)]
, Q ∈ Qθ∗ . (2.4)
Remark 2.12. This robust representation can also be inferred from the general results of [27]. However,
for the sake of completeness and since the multivariate shortfall risk measure is closely related to a
multidimensional version of the optimized certainty equivalent, we give a self contained proof tailored to
our context.
2In the sense that R(X +m) = R(X) +
∑
mk .
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The argumentation follows the original one by [31], which however cannot be directly applied on
the product space Ω × {1, . . . , d} since the optimization is done here according to multidimensional
allocations m ∈ Rd rather than one dimensional allocations m ∈ R. Moreover, in the course of our
derivation of the dual representation we extend to the multidimensional setting the following relationship
between the optimized certainty equivalent and the shortfall risk provided in [9, Chapter 5.2]
R(X) = inf
m∈R
{m : E [`(L−m)] ≤ 0} = sup
λ>0
inf
m∈R
{m+ λE [`(X −m)]} ,
where
S(λ,X) = inf
m∈R
{m+ λE [`(X −m)]} = sup
QP
{
EQ[X]− E
[
λ`∗
(
dQ
λdP
)]}
is the optimized certainty equivalent of X .3 
Proof. By Proposition 2.7 (v), we have A(X) 6= ∅ and in turn R(X) < ∞. If R(X) = −∞ for some
X ∈ Mθ, then there exists a sequence (mn) ⊆ A(X) such that ∑mnk → −∞, in contradiction with
0 ≥ E[`(X − mn)] ≥ E[∑Xk] −∑mnk − c. Hence, R(X) > −∞. Monotonicity, convexity and
translation invariance readily follow from Proposition 2.7 (ii), (iii) and (iv), respectively. In particular, R
is a convex, real-valued and increasing functional on the Banach latticeMθ. Hence, by [18, Theorem 4.1],
R is continuous and sub-differentiable. Therefore, the results recalled in Appendix B and the Fenchel-
Moreau theorem imply
R(X) = sup
Y ∈Lθ∗
{E [X · Y ]−R∗(Y )} = max
Y ∈Lθ∗
{E [X · Y ]−R∗(Y )} , (2.5)
where R∗(Y ) = sup{E[X · Y ]−R(X) : X ∈Mθ}, Y ∈ Lθ∗ . By the bipolar theorem, for Y 6> 0, there
exists K ∈ Mθ, K > 0 with E[Y ·K] < −ε < 0 for some ε > 0. By monotonicity of R, it follows that
R(−λK) ≤ R(0) <∞ for every λ > 0. Hence
R∗(Y ) = sup
X∈Mθ
{E [Y ·X]−R(X)} ≥ sup
λ>0
{−λE[Y ·K]−R(−λK)} ≥ sup
λ
λε−R(0) =∞,
Furthermore, by translation invariance, setting X = (r, . . . , r) for r ∈ R, it follows that
R∗(Y ) ≥ rE [1 · Y ]−R(0)− rd = r (E [1 · Y ]− d)−R(0),
where the right hand side can be made arbitrarily large whenever E [1 · Y ] 6= d. It shows that the supre-
mum and maximum in (2.5) can be restricted to the set of those Y ∈ Lθ∗ such that Y > 0 andE[1·Y ] = 1,
that is, can be identified to Qθ∗ . In order to obtain a more explicit expression of the penalty function
α(Q) := R∗(dQ/dP ) = R∗(Y ), we set
L(m,λ,X) =
∑
mk + λE [` (X −m)]
S(λ,X) = inf
m∈Rd
L(m,λ,X) = inf
m∈Rd
{∑
mk + λE [` (X −m)]
}
.
The functional X 7→ S(λ,X) is a multivariate version of the so called optimized certainty equivalent,
see [9]. Clearly,
R(X) = inf
m∈Rd
sup
λ>0
L(m,λ,X) ≥ sup
λ>0
inf
m∈Rd
L(m,λ,X) = sup
λ>0
S(λ,X).
3Here ` is a one dimensional loss function and X a one dimensional random variable.
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Since A(X) is nonempty and monotone, there exists m ∈ Int(A(X)) and so the Slater condition is ful-
filled. As a consequence of [42, Theorem 28.2], there is no duality gap. Namely,R(X) = supλ>0 S(λ,X).
Via the first part of the proof, an easy multivariate adaptation of [9, Chapter 4] and [23, Chapter 2] yields
S(λ,X) = sup
Q∈Qθ∗
{
EQ [X]− E
[
(`λ)
∗
(
dQ
dP
)]}
,
where `λ(m) = λ`(m), hence `∗λ(m
∗) = λ`∗(m∗/λ). Combining this with R(X) = supλ>0 S(λ,X),
the dual representation (2.4) follows. 
Example 2.13. We consider the two positive homogeneous loss functions of the empirical study:
`1(x) = β
∑
x+k − α
∑
x−k (2.6)
`2(x) = β
∑
x+k − α
∑
x−k + β
∑
k<j
(xk + xj)
+ − α
∑
k<j
(xk + xj)
− (2.7)
for 0 < α < 1 < β. A simple computation yields that `∗i = δ(·|Ci) where
C1 = {x : α ≤ xk ≤ β for all k}
C2 =
x = ∑
1≤j≤d
x0jek +
∑
1≤k<j≤d
xkj(ek + ej) : α ≤ xkj ≤ β for all 0 ≤ k < j ≤ d

Note that [α, β] = C1 ⊆ C2 ⊆ [α, dβ] where α and β are identified with their vector of equal com-
ponents. Furthermore, dβ is an extreme point of C2. It follows in particular that R1 ≤ R2. By positive
homogeneity, α∗i only takes values 0 or ∞. It follows that α∗i (Q) = 0 if and only if there exits λ > 0
such that dQ/dP ∈ λCi almost surely. Since 1 has to be in λCi for this to happen, we can constrain
1/β ≤ λ ≤ 1/α in the case of C1 and 1/(dβ) ≤ λ ≤ 1/α in the case of C2. Thus
R1(X) = sup
{
EQ [X] :
dQk
dP
∈ λC1 for some 1/β ≤ λ ≤ 1/α
}
R2(X) = sup
{
EQ [X] :
dQ
dP
∈ λC2 for some 1/(dβ) ≤ λ ≤ 1/α
} ♦
3. Risk Allocation
We have established in Theorem 2.11 that the infimum over all allocations m ∈ Rd used for defining
R(X) is real valued and has the desired properties of a risk measure. Beyond the question of the overall
liquidity reserve, the allocation of this amount between the different risk components is key for systemic
risk purposes. We therefore address in this section the following questions:
• The existence of a risk allocation;
• The uniqueness of a risk allocation;
• The impact of the interdependence structure,
10
The first question is important in some applications such as the default fund contribution of each member
of a clearing house or the allocation of the capital among the different business lines of a bank. As for
the second question, non-uniqueness can become an issue when this allocation is a regulatory cost for
the different members or desks. If no additional clear rule is provided, the members would then face
arbitrariness as for their contributions for the same overall risk. As for the last question, systemic risk
should reflect the level of dependence of the system. For instance, highly correlated losses, while having
the same marginal risk, should result into a higher systemic risk and different optimal allocations.
Definition 3.1. A risk allocation is an acceptable monetary allocation m ∈ A(X) such that R(X) =∑
mk. When a risk allocation is uniquely determined, we denote it by RA(X).
Remark 3.2. By definition, if a risk allocation exists, then the full allocation property automatically holds;
see also Section 4.3. 
In contrast to the univariate case, where the unique risk allocation is given by m = R(X), existence
and uniqueness are no longer straightforward in the multivariate case. The following example shows that
existence may fail.
Example 3.3. Consider the loss function `(x, y) = x + y + (x + y)+/(1 − y) − 1 if y < 1 and ∞
otherwise. It follows thatA(0) = {m ∈ R2 : m2 > −1 and 1 ≥ −m1−m2+(−m1−m2)+/(1+m2)}.
Computations yield R(0) = infm2>−1{m2− (m22 + 3m2 + 1)/(m2 + 2)} = −1. However, the infimum
is not attained. ♦
Our next result introduces conditions towards the existence and uniqueness of a risk allocation.
Definition 3.4. We call a loss function ` permutation invariant if, `(x) = `(pi(x)) holds for every per-
mutation pi of the components of the vector x.
Note that the loss function used in Example 3.3 is not permutation invariant. We denote by Z = {u ∈
Rd :
∑
uk = 0} the set of zero-sum allocations.
Theorem 3.5. If ` is a permutation invariant loss function, then, for every X ∈Mθ, risk allocations m∗
exist. They are characterized by the first order conditions
1 ∈ λ∗E [∇` (X −m∗)] and E [` (X −m∗)] = 0, (3.1)
where λ∗ is a Lagrange multiplier. In particular, when ` has no zero-sum direction of recession4 except
0, the set of the solutions (m∗, λ∗) to the first order conditions (3.1) is bounded.
If `(x + ·) is strictly convex along zero-sums allocations for every x with `(x) ≥ 0, then the risk
allocation is unique.
Proof. Let m in A(X), according to Theorem A.1, it holds
0+A(X) =
{
u ∈ Rd : E [` (X −m− ru)] ≤ 0, for all r > 0}
=
{
u ∈ Rd : sup
r>0
E
[
`(X −m− ru)− `(0)
r
]
≤ 0
}
=
{
u ∈ Rd : E
[
sup
r>0
`(X −m− ru)− `(0)
r
]
≤ 0
}
= −0+`
4We refer the reader to Appendix A regarding the notions and properties of recession cones and functions. In particular, if ` has
no zero-sum direction of recession except 0, then ` is an unbiased loss function.
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Further, we define f(m) =
∑
mk + δ(m|A(X)). It follows that f is increasing, convex, lower semi-
continuous, proper and such thatR(X) = inf f . Since `(x) ≥∑xk−c andR(X) > −∞, for b ∈ A(X)
it holds
−∞ < R(X) ≤
∑
bk + r
∑
uk ≤ γ <∞ and b+ ru ∈ A(X)
showing that 0+f = Z ∩ 0+A(X) = −Z ∩ 0+`. By [42, Theorem 27.1 (b)], the existence of a risk allo-
cation follows from f being constant along its directions of recession 0+f , which according to Theorem
A.1, is equivalent to u ∈ 0+f implies (−u) ∈ 0+f . However, since ` is permutation invariant it follows
that 0+` = −0+` and therefore u ∈ 0+f implies that−u ∈ 0+f . Thus the existence of a risk allocation.5
In particular, if 0+` = 0, then by [42, Theorem 27.1, (d)], the set of risk allocations is non-empty and
bounded. Furthermore, since E[`(X − m)] < 0 for some m large enough, the Slater condition for the
convex optimization problem R(X) = infm f(m) is fulfilled. Hence, according to [42, Theorems 28.1,
28.2 and 28.3], optimal solutions m∗ are characterized by (3.1).
Finally, let m 6= n be two risk allocations. It follows that αm + (1 − α)n is a risk allocation as
well for every α ∈ [0, 1]. Furthermore, (m − n) is a zero sum allocation. By convexity, it follows that
0 = E[`(X − αm − (1 − α)n)] ≤ αE[`(X −m)] + (1 − α)E[`(X − n)] = 0 for every 0 ≤ α ≤ 1,
which shows that α`(X − m) + (1 − α)`(X − n) = `(X − αm − (1 − α)n) P -almost surely for
every 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Since `(x + ·) is strictly convex on Z for every x such that `(x) ≥ 0, it follows that
P [`(X − αm− (1− α)n) < 0] = 1 for every 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, showing in particular that E[`(X −m)] < 0,
a contradiction. 
Corollary 3.6. Let ` be a permutation invariant loss function, such that `(x+ ·) is strictly convex along
zero-sum allocations for every x with `(x) ≥ 0. It holds
RA(X + r) = RA(X) + r, for every X ∈Mθ and r ∈ Rd.
If ` is additionally positive homogeneous, it holds
RA (λX) = λRA(X), for every X ∈Mθ and λ > 0
Proof. From Theorem 3.5, the assumptions on ` ensure the existence and uniqueness of a risk allocation
uniquely characterized, together with the Lagrange multiplier, by the first order conditions. Let m =
RA(X+r), for which there exists a unique λ such that λE [∇` (X + r −m)] = 1 andE[`(X+r−m)] =
c. Hence, n = m− r and λ satisfy the first order conditions λE[∇`(X − n)] = 1 and E[`(X − n)] = c,
which by uniqueness shows that n = RA(X) = m− r = RA(X + r)− r. As for the second assertion,
it follows from A(λX) = λA(X) for every λ > 0 according to Proposition 2.7.
Remark 3.7. In general, the positivity of the risk allocation is not required. However, if positivity or any
other convex constraint is imposed, for instance by regulators, it can easily be embedded in our setup. In
case of positivity, this would modify the definition of R(X) into
R(X) = inf
{∑
mk : E [`(X −m)] ≤ 0 and mk ≥ 0 for every k
}
,
with accordingly modified first order conditions. 
As already mentioned, the following example illustrates the importance of the uniqueness.
5Note that this computation shows that the condition Z ∩ 0+` = −Z ∩ 0+` is sufficient to get the existence of a risk allocation.
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Example 3.8. Any loss function of class (C1), that is, `(x) = h(
∑
xk), is permutation invariant. Thus,
a risk allocation m∗ ∈ A(X) exists by means of Theorem 3.5. However, for any zero-sum allocation u,
we have R(X) =
∑
m∗k + uk =
∑
m∗k and E[h(
∑
Xk − (m∗k + uk))] = E[h(
∑
Xk −m∗k)] ≤ c, so
that m∗ + u is another risk allocation.
In terms of regulatory costs, this is a problematic situation. Indeed, consider two banks and require
from them 110 M e and 500 M e, respectively, as capital allocation. In such a case, one could equally
well require 610 M e from the first bank and nothing from the second. Such arbitrariness is unlikely to
be accepted in that case. ♦
Example 3.8 shows that loss functions of the class (C1) lack the uniqueness of a risk allocation. By
contrast, for loss functions of class (C2), that is, `(x) =
∑
h(xk), the following proposition shows that,
while there exists a unique risk allocation under very mild conditions, the risk allocation only depends on
the marginal distributions of the loss vector X = (X1, . . . , Xd). In other words, the risk measure and the
risk allocation do not reflect the dependence structure of the system.
Proposition 3.9. Let `(x) :=
∑
hk(xk) for univariate loss functions hk : R→ (−∞,∞] strictly convex
on R+, k = 1, . . . , d. For every X ∈ Mθ, there exists a unique optimal risk allocation RA(X) and we
have RA(X) = RA(Y ), for every Y ∈Mθ such that Yk has the same distribution as Xk, k = 1, . . . , d.
Proof. Let x, y be such that αx+(1−α)y 6∈ Rd− for every α ∈ (0, 1). It follows that `(αx+(1−α)y) =∑
hk(αxk + (1 − α)yk) <
∑
αhk(xk) + (1 − α)hk(yk) = α`(x) + (1 − α)`(y). The loss function
` is furthermore unbiased. Indeed, for every zero-sum allocation u, assuming without loss of generality
u1 > 0, it follows that
`0+(u) ≥ lim
r→∞h1(ru1)/r +
∑
k≥2
hk(ruk)/r ≥ lim
r→∞h1(ru1)/r +
∑
k≥2
uk =∞
since h1 is strictly convex and h1(t) ≥ t. Hence, ` has no zero-sum direction of recession other than 0.
The strict convexity of hk yields, according to Theorem 3.5, the existence of a unique risk allocation for
every X ∈Mθ. The first order conditions (3.1) are written as
1 ∈ λE [∂hk(Xk −mk)] , k = 1, . . . , d, and
∑
E [hk (Xk −mk)] = c,
which only depend on the marginal distributions of X . 
Following Rüschendorf [44] we can characterise in terms of supermodular, directionally convex and upper
orthant stochastic ordering the risk of positive dependence in terms of `. For a function f : Rd → R we
define
∆k,yf(x) = f(x0, . . . , xk + yk, . . . , xd)− f(x), x, y ∈ Rd, k ∈ {1, . . . , d}
We say that a continuous function f : Rd → R is
• super-modular, if ∆k,y∆l,yf(x) ≥ 0 for every 1 ≤ k < l ≤ d;
• directionally convex, if ∆k,y∆l,yf(x) ≥ 0 for every 1 ≤ k ≤ l ≤ d;
• ∆-monotone, if ∆i1,y . . .∆in,yf(x) ≥ 0 for every {i1, . . . , in} ⊆ {1, . . . , d};
for every x and y in Rd with y > 0. We denote by <sm, <dc and <uo the integral orders given by the
respective class of functions. We refer to [44] for a discussion of these orders in terms of dependence risk.
Note that X >uo Y if and only if P [X > x] ≥ P [Y > x] for every x ∈ Rd.
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Proposition 3.10. The shortfall risk measure R is monotone with respect with <sm, <dc or <uo when-
ever ` is super-modular, directionally convex, or ∆-monotone, respectively.
Proof. The assertion follows immediately from the fact that if ` is one of super-modular, directionally
convex, or ∆-monotone, so is `(·−m) for everym. Therefore ifX <x Y , it follows that E[`(X−m)] ≥
E[`(Y −m)] showing that A(Y ) ⊆ A(X). 
Remark 3.11. Any loss function of the form (C1), (C2) and (C3) are directionally convex and therefore
super-modular. They are ∆-monotone if d = 2. As for the specific loss functions used in this paper in
several places for illustration
∑ (x+k )2
2
+ α
∑
k<j
x+k x
+
j∑
x+k + α
∑
k<j
(xj + xj)
+
are both directionally convex and ∆-monotone. However, if α = 0 they are degenerated in terms of these
monotonicity since ∆k,y∆j,y`(x) = 0 for every k 6= j. As soon as α > 0, these loss functions are strictly
monotone on Rd+. 
Remark 3.12. A loss function can be chosen in view of an a-priori list of wished properties in terms of
risk measurement and allocation as the Proposition above mentioned. However, loss function may also
arise in systemic risk problems as an intrinsic property of the system as presented by Eisenberg and Noe
[25] or recently by Awiszus and Weber [7]. 
Example 3.13. The following simple example shows the impact of the dependence in a simple case for
a loss function
`(x1, x2) =
1
1 + α
[
1
2
e2x1 +
1
2
e2x2 + αex1ex2
]
− 1. (3.2)
that is ∆-monotone and bivariate normal vector X = (X1, X2) ∼ N (0,Σ) with Σ =
[
σ21 ρσ1σ2
ρσ1σ2 σ
2
2
]
.
Solving the first order conditions yield
RAi(X) = σ
2
i +
1
2
SRC(ρ, σ1, σ2, α) R(X) = σ
2
1 + σ
2
2 + SRC(ρ, σ1, σ2, α),
showing that the risk allocations are disentangled into the respective individual contributions σ2i , i = 1, 2,
and a systemic risk contribution
SRC = ln
(
1 + αeρσ1σ2−
1
2 (σ
2
1+σ
2
2)
)
, (3.3)
which depends on the correlation parameter ρ and on the systemic weight α of the loss function. Figure
2 shows the value of this systemic risk contribution as a function of ρ and σ1. Computing the partial
derivatives with respect to σi and ρ yields
∂SRC
∂σ1
=
α (ρσ2 − σ1)
2
eρσ1σ2−
1
2 (σ
2
1+σ
2
2)
1 + αeρσ1σ2−
1
2 (σ
2
1+σ
2
2)
,
∂SRC
∂ρ
=
ασ1σ2
2
eρσ1σ2−
1
2 (σ
2
1+σ
2
2)
1 + αeρσ1σ2−
1
2 (σ
2
1+σ
2
2)
.
showing that the systemic risk contribution is
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Figure 2: SRC (3.3) as a function of σ1 for different values of the correlation ρ in the case where α = 1.
• increasing with respect to the correlation ρ;
• decreasing with respect to σ1 if the correlation is negative;
• increasing up to ρσ2 and then decreasing with respect to σ1 if the correlation is positive as the individual
risk of X1 dominates the risk of the system. ♦
4. Systemic Sensitivity of Shortfall Risk and its Allocation
The previous results emphasize the importance of using a loss function that adequately captures the
systemic risk inherent to the system. This motivates the study of the sensitivity of shortfall risk and its
allocation so as to identify the systemic features of a loss function.
Definition 4.1. The marginal risk contribution of Y ∈ Mθ to X ∈ Mθ is defined as the sensitivity of
the risk of X with respect to the impact of Y , that is
R(X;Y ) := lim sup
t↘0
R(X + tY )−R(X)
t
.
In the case whereR(X+ tY ) admits a unique risk allocationRA(X+ tY ) for every t, the risk allocation
marginals of the risk of X with respect to the impact of Y are given by
RAk(X;Y ) = lim sup
t↘0
RAk(X + tY )−RAk(X)
t
, k = 1, . . . , d.
Theorem 2.11 and its proof show that the determination of the risk measure R(X) reduces to the saddle
point problem
R(X) = min
m
max
λ>0
L(m,λ,X) = max
λ>0
min
m
L(m,λ,X).
Using [42], the “argminmax” set of saddle points (m∗, λ∗) is a product set that we denote by B(X) ×
C(X).
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Theorem 4.2. Assuming that ` is permutation invariant, then
R(X;Y ) = min
m∈B(X)
max
λ∈C(X)
λE [∇` (X −m) · Y ] .
Supposing further that ` is twice differentiable and that (m,λ) ∈ B(X)× C(X) is such that
M =
[
λE
[∇2`(X −m)] −1/λ
1 0
]
is non-singular, then
• there exists t0 > 0 such that B(X + tY )× C(X + tY ) is a singleton, for every 0 ≤ t ≤ t0;
• the corresponding unique saddle point (mt, λt) = (RA(X+tY ), λt) is differentiable as a function
of t and we have [
RA(X;Y )
λ(X;Y )
]
= M−1V,
where λ(X;Y ) = lim supt↘0(λt − λ0)/t and
V =
[
λE
[∇2`(X −m)Y ]
R(X;Y )
]
.
Proof. Let L(m,λ, t) =
∑
mk + λE[`(X + tY −m)]. Theorem 2.11 yields
R(X + tY ) = min
m
max
λ
L(m,λ, t) = max
λ
min
m
L(m,λ, t) = L(mt, λt, t),
for every selection (mt, λt) ∈ B(X+tY )×C(t+tY ). Regarding the first assertion of the theorem, since
` has no zero-sum direction of recession other than 0, it follows from Theorem 3.5 that B(X) × C(X)
is non empty and bounded. Hence, the assumptions of Golshtein’s Theorem on the perturbation of saddle
values, see Rockafellar and Wets [43, Theorem 11.52], are satisfied and the first assertion follows. As for
the second assertion, the assumptions of Fiacco and McCormick [29, Theorem 6, pp. 34–45] are fulfilled.
The Jacobian of the vector [ ∇mL(m,λ, 0)
λE [` (X −m)]
]
that is used to specify the first order conditions is given by the matrix M . Hence, the second assertion
follows from [29, Theorem 6, pp. 34–35]. 
Theorem 4.2 allows to explicitly derive the impact of an independent exogenous shock as stated in the
following proposition.
Proposition 4.3. Under the assumptions of Theorem 4.2 ensuring the uniqueness of a saddle point, sup-
pose that Y is independent of X . Then
RC(X;Y ) =
∑
E [Yk] and RA(X;Y ) = E[Y ].
Proof. Since Y is independent of X , denoting by m = RA(X;Y ), it follows from the first order condi-
tions that
RC(X;Y ) = λE [∇`(X −m) · Y ] = λE [∇`(X −m)] · E[Y ] = 1 · E[Y ] =
∑
E[Yk]
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Furthermore, we have
M =
[
λA −B
C 0
]
and V =
[
λE
[∇2`(X −m)Y ]
R(X;Y )
]
=
[
λAE[Y ]
CE[Y ]
]
whereA = E[∇2`(X−m)]B = [1/λ · · · 1/λ]ᵀ, andC = [1 . . . 1]. Using the classical formula
of block matrix inversion, we obtain
RA(X;Y ) =
[
A−1
λ
− A
−1BCA−1
λCA−1B
A−1B
CA−1B
] [
λAE[Y ]
CE[Y ]
]
= E [Y ]− A
−1BCE [Y ]
CA−1B
+
A−1BCE [Y ]
CA−1B
= E [Y ] . 
According to the discussion about causal responsibility in Section 4.3, it follows that each member
is marginally paying for the additional risk is takes provided this one is independent of the system.
In particular, if the risk factor k is affected by a shock Yk independent of the system, it follows that
R(X;Y ) = E[Yk] = RAk(X;Y ), showing that the member k pays for the full risks it takes.
4.1. Impact of an Exogenous Shock
The following Section illustrates the case when the exogenous shock may depend on X . We consider
a bivariate situation where X = (X1, X3), and exogenous factor Y = (Y1, 0) impacting only the first
component. We consider the loss function
`(x1, x2) =
(x+1 )
2 + (x+2 )
2
2
+ αx+1 x
+
2 − 1, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1,
which gives rise to a unique risk allocation by virtue of Theorem 3.5. Note that ` is ∆-monotone, and
strictly on R2+ if α > 0. For ease of notations, we assume that X1 ∼ X2, which, since ` is permutation
invariant, implies thatm = RA1(X) = RA2(X). Let p =: P [X1 ≥ m] = P [X2 ≥ m] and r = P [X1 ≥
m;X2 ≥ m]. According to Theorem 4.2, and the first order condition (3.1), we have
R(X;Y ) =
E [Y1(X1 −m1)+] + αpE [Y1(X2 −m2)+|X1 ≥ m1]
E [(X1 −m1)+] + αpE [(X2 −m2)+|X2 ≥ m2]
As for the allocation of this marginal risk contribution, in the notation of Theorem 4.2, we have:
M =
 λp λαr −1/λλαr λp −1/λ
1 1 0
 and V =
 λpE [Y1|X1 ≥ m1]λαrE [Y1|X1 ≥ m1;X2 ≥ m2]
R(X;Y )
 ,
which by inverting M yields
RA1(X;Y ) =
R(X;Y )
2
+
1
2
E
[
Y11{X1≥m1}
]− αE [Y11{X1≥m1;X2≥m2}]
p− αr
RA2(X;Y ) =
R(X;Y )
2
− 1
2
E
[
Y11{X1≥m1}
]− αE [Y11{X1≥m1;X2≥m2}]
p− αr
Beyond the fact that according to Proposition 4.3, if Y is independent ofX thenR(X;Y ) = RA1(X;Y )
and RA2(X;Y ) = 0, observe in general that:
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• The two risk components marginally share first equally the additional cost of the exogenous impact in
terms of R(X;Y )/2 each.
• The asymmetry of the shock that concerns only X1 is reflected in the correction with respect to the
second term which is added to the first one and subtracted to the second. Furthermore, 1{X1≥m1} ≥
α1{X1≥m1;X2≥m2} for every 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. It implies that the additional risk taken by the first risk factor is
always positively proportional to Y1 while the second one is negatively proportional to Y1.
• If α = 0, then the marginal change impact the risk factors according to ±(E[Y1]−E[Y1|X1 ≥ m])/2.
• If α = 1 and X1 and X2 are strongly anti-correlated, then 1{X1≥m;X2≥m} is likely very small and
therefore the effect is similar to the case where α = 0. On the other hand, if X1 and X2 are strongly
correlated, then 1{X1≥m} ≈ 1{X1≥m;X2≥m} and in that case RA1(X;Y ) ≈ RA2(X;Y ) ≈ R(X;Y )/2
showing that the full dependence with α = 1 yields an equal share of the marginal risk changes.
4.2. Sensitivity to Dependence
Following the previous section where the loss function depends on α that impacts the risk allocation with
respect to the degree of dependence between risk factors, we apply the techniques of Theorem 4.2 to
study the sensitivity with respect to α. To this end we consider a loss function of the following form
`(x) =
∑
g(xk) + αh(x),
where g is a one dimensional loss function and h a multidimensional function such that ` is a loss function
for all α ≥ 0 close enough to 0. For instance a loss function of the class (C3). We also suppose that g
is twice differentiable. Using the same strategy as in the proof of the Theorem 4.2, we can provide the
marginal risk contribution and allocation as a function of α around 0, stressing the dependence part of the
loss function. Computations yield
∂αR(X) = λE [h(X −m)] and ∂α
[
R(X)
λ′
]
= M−1
[
λE [∇h(X −m)]
∂αR(X)
]
where M is given by M =
[
λA −B
C 0
]
and A = diag(g′′(Xk −mk)) and B and C as in the proof of
Proposition 4.3. In the case where
`(x) =
1
2
3∑
k=1
(x+k )
2 + α
∑
1≤k<j≤3
x+k x
+
j − 1
andX = (X1, X2, X3) withX1 ∼ X2 ∼ X3, (X1, X2) ∼ (X2, X1) andX3 independent of (X1, X2), it
follows thatm = RAk(X) for every k = 1, 2, 3. Defining Z = (X1−m)+ ∼ (X2−m)+ ∼ (X3−m)+,
computations yields
∂αR(X) = E[Z]
(
2 +
E[(X1 −m)+(X2 −m)+]
E[Z]2
)
.
Hence, with increasing correlation between X1 and X2 the marginal risk increases. As for the impact on
the risk allocation, since E[(X1 −m)+|X2 ≥ m] = E[(X2 −m)+|X1 ≥ m] it simplifies to
∂αRA1 or 2(X) =
E[Z]
3
(
1 +
E[(X2 −m)+|X1 ≥ m]
E[Z]
+
E[(X1 −m)+(X2 −m)+]
E[Z]2
)
∂αRA3(X) =
E[Z]
3
(
4− 2E[(X2 −m)
+|X1 ≥ m]
E[Z]
+
E[(X1 −m)+(X2 −m)+]
E[Z]2
)
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Due to the asymmetric dependence of the system:
• One the one hand, if X1 and X2 are highly anti-correlated, then
∂αRA1 or 2(X) ≈ E[Z]
3
and ∂αRA3(X) ≈ 4E[Z]
3
The systemic risk factor is advantaging those who are anti-correlated, with respect to the others.
• On the other hand, if X1 and X2 are highly correlated, then for p = P [X1 ≥ m],
∂αRA1 or 2(X) ≈ E[Z]
3
(
p+ 1
p
+
E[Z2]
E[Z]2
)
while ∂αRA3(X) ≈ E[Z]
3
(
2
p− 1
p
+
E[Z2]
E[Z]2
)
Since p ≤ 1, the systemic risk factor penalizes those who are highly correlated and reduces the costs for
the one who is independent with respect to the previous case.
Figure 3 illustrate this fact for different correlation values in the case of a 3-variate normal distribution
X ∼ N
0,
1 ρ 0ρ 1 0
0 0 1

Figure 3: Systemic factor marginal change of the risk allocation and total risk for different correlations ρ.
4.3. Riskless Allocation, Causal Responsibility and Additivity
We conclude this section regarding risk allocation and its sensitivity by a discussion of their properties in
light of the following economic features of risk allocations introduced in [14].
(FA) Full Allocation:
∑
RAk(X) = R(X);
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(RA) Riskless Allocation: RAk(X) = Xk if Xk is deterministic;
(CR) Causal Responsibility: R(X + ∆Xk)−R(X) = RAk(X + ∆Xk)−RAk(X), where ∆Xk is a
loss increment of the k-th risk component;
As mentioned before, per design, shortfall risk allocations always satisfy the full allocation property
(FA). As visible from the above case studies, riskless allocation (RA) and causal responsibility (CR) are
not satisfied in general. In fact, from a systemic risk point of view, we think that (RA) and (CR) are not
desirable properties. Indeed, both imply that risk taking, or non-taking, should only impact the concerned
risk component. However, the risk components are interdependent and any move in one of them bears
consequences to the rest of the system. The search for an optimal allocation is a non-cooperative game
between the different system components, each of them respectively looking for its own minimal risk
allocation while impacting the others by doing so. In other words, everyone is responsible for its own
risk but also for its relative exposure with respect to the others. The sensitivity analysis of this section
however shows that external shocks are primarily born by the risk component that is hit at least in a first
order. In the case where this shock is independent of the system, by Proposition 4.3 it is then a full causal
responsibility. Otherwise, a correction appears and a fraction of the shock is offloaded to the other risk
components according to their relative exposure to the concerned component and dependence with the
shock.
5. Computational Aspects of Risk Allocation
In this section we present computational results based on the loss function of Example 2.3, that is,
`(x) =
d∑
k=1
xk +
1
2
d∑
k=1
(x+k )
2 + α
∑
1≤j<k≤d
x+j x
+
k − 1, (5.1)
for α = 0 or 1. In that case, the constrained problem (2.2) becomes:
R(X) := inf
{∑
mk :
d∑
k=1
E [Xk −mk] + 1
2
d∑
k=1
E
[
(Xk −mk)+
]2
+ α
∑
1≤j<k≤d
E
[
(Xj −mj)+ (Xk −mk)+
]
≤ 1
} (5.2)
According to Theorem 3.5, the risk allocation is determined by the first order conditions (3.1), which read
in this case:
λE[(Xk −mk)+] + αλ
d∑
j=1,j 6=k
E[(Xj −mj)+1{Xk≥mk}] = 1− λ, for k = 1, . . . , d;
d∑
k=1
{
E[(Xk −mk)] + 1
2
E[((Xk −mk)+)2]
}
+ α
∑
1≤j<k≤d
E[(Xk −mk)+(Xj −mj)+] = 1.
(5.3)
We use Gaussian distributions with mean vector µ and variance-covariance matrix Σ for the loss vector
X . In the bi- and tri-variate cases the variance-covariance matrix is parameterized by a single correlation
factor ρ and the variances σ2k of Xk for all k. In other words, Σij = ρσiσj for i 6= j. We write CT
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for computational time. The implementation was done on standard desktop computers in the Python
programming language. To solve the constrained problem (2.2), we use the Sequential Least SQuares
Programming (SLSQP) algorithm, in combination with Monte Carlo, Fourier or Chebychev interpolation
schemes, briefly described below, for the computation of the expectations in (5.3).
Fourier methods Assuming that the moment generating functions of the considered distributions are
available, Fourier methods allow us to compute the different expectations in (5.3), based on methods
presented among other in Eberlein et al. [24] and Drapeau et al. [23] for details. The main advantage of
this method is that it is theoretically possible to compute the value of the integrals at any level of precision,
while the basic computational time is roughly doubled for every additional digit of accuracy. However, as
seen in the subsequent computations this method suffers from the large number of double integrals to be
computed, for which the computational time can become prohibitively long.
Monte-Carlo Methods We can also use Monte Carlo simulations for the estimation of the many inte-
grals in (5.3). An important observation here is that we can generate and store all realizations in advance,
and then use them for the estimation of the functions for different m in every step of the root-finding
procedure. The main advantage of Monte Carlo relative to Fourier methods is that a wider variety of
models can be considered; think, for example, of models with copulas or of random variables with Pareto
type distributions as considered in the empirical study in Section 6. The main disadvantage is the slow
statistical convergence of the scheme, in our context though is fast enough. In addition, the time to gen-
erate, once and for all, the samples, as well as to compute the Monte Carlo averages, is very fast and
independent of the value of m.
Chebychev interpolation A numerical scheme well-suited to approximate the large numbers of func-
tions in the context of optimization routines is the Chebyshev interpolation method. This method, recently
applied to option pricing by Gaß et al. [33], can be summarized as follows: Suppose you want to evaluate
quickly a function F (m), of one or several variables, for a large number of m’s. The first step of the
Chebyshev method is to evaluate the function F (m) on a given set of nodes mi, 1 ≤ i ≤ N . These
evaluations can be computed by Fourier or Monte Carlo schemes, are independent of each other and can
thus be realized in parallel. The next step, in order to compute F (m) for an m outside the nodes mi, is to
perform a polynomial interpolation of the F (mi)’s using the Chebyshev coefficients. In other words, the
Chebyshev method provides a polynomial approximation Fˆ (m) of F (m).
Discussion: Whether it is advantageous to use the Chebyshev interpolation or not, is a matter of two
competing factors that affect the computational time: On the one hand, the number of iterations I(d)
needed to find the root of the system and, on the other hand, the size of the gridN2 used in the Chebyshev
interpolation. Our findings reveals that the Monte Carlo schemes are better than the Fourier schemes in
the range of our accuracy requirements, since they require the least amount of work during each step
of the root-finding procedure or for the pre-processing computations in the Chebyshev method. Only
when the dimension is low, less than three or α = 0 can the Fourier methods be faster. Next, the choice
between Chebyshev or not is a matter of comparison between I(d) and N2. In high dimensions, when
I(d) dominates N2, with I(d) being in principle of order d and N usually between 10 and 20, then
the Chebyshev method is less costly. Furthermore, the Chebyshev method can intensively benefit from
parallel computing as the pre-processing step is not sequential.
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5.1. Bivariate case
We suppose that d = 2 and consider a bivariate Gaussian distribution with zero mean, σ1 = σ2 = 1
and correlation ρ in {−0.9,−0.5,−0.2, 0, 0.2, 0.5, 0.9}. When setting α = 0, that is without systemic
risk weight, the result m∗ does not depend on the correlation value. Since σ1 = σ2 = 1 the allocation is
symmetric and we findm∗1 ≈ −0.173. Explicit formulas for the involved expectations are available in this
case and this yields of course the fastest computation. Fourier methods are quite fast (CT ≈ 3× explicit
formula) as we only need to compute 1-dimensional integrals. In order to get a high approximation in
the Chebychev approximation, one must use 20 nodes for each integral. Since the number of iterations in
the optimizations is about, the Chebychev method coupled with Fourier transforms is slower than Fourier
without it. Finally, Monte-Carlo is≈ 20 to 40× slower than Fourier, becoming the slowest method in that
case. When setting α = 1, the values of the risk allocation are increasing with respect to ρ, as expected,
see Table 1. The Monte-Carlo method becomes the fastest one. Indeed, we now need to compute bi-
variate integrals in (5.3). Even if Fourier methods are fast (from 30 seconds to almost 3 minutes), they are
still ≈ 10 to 50 slower than Monte-Carlo. Moreover, using even as little as 10 nodes in the Chebychev
interpolation, which is not very accurate, increases the total computational time because of the number of
2-dimensional integrals to compute in the preprocessing step.
Fourier Fourier + Chebychev 10 nodes Monte Carlo 2 Mio
ρ m∗1 CT m
∗
1 CT m
∗
1 CT
−0.9 -0.167 61520 ms -0.150 45 m 18 s -0.167 3257 ms
−0.5 -0.143 37100 ms -0.132 30 m 27 s -0.143 3357 ms
−0.2 -0.120 45200 ms -0.113 25 m 21 s -0.120 3414 ms
0 -0.103 51800 ms -0.098 24 m 52 s -0.103 3302 ms
0.2 -0.085 75700 ms -0.082 27 m 55 s -0.085 3417 ms
0.5 -0.057 158000 ms -0.055 32 m 10 s -0.056 3250 ms
0.9 -0.013 88900 ms -0.012 55 m 04 s -0.012 3387 ms
Table 1: Bivariate case with systemic weight, that is, for α = 1.
5.2. Trivariate Case
In this section, we illustrate the systemic contribution of the loss function with three risk components and
study the impact of the interdependence of two components with respect to the third one. We start with a
Gaussian vector with the variance-covariance matrix
Σ =
 0.5 0.5ρ 00.5ρ 0.5 0
0 0 0.6
 ,
for different correlations ρ ∈ {−0.9,−0.5,−0.2, 0, 0.2, 0.5, 0.9}. Here the third risk component has a
higher marginal risk than the first two so that, in the absence of systemic component, it should contribute
most to the overall risk. When α = 0, this is indeed the case. The result is independent of the correlation
and is typically overall lower, charging the risk component with the highest variance more –m∗3 ≈ −0.12
– than the other two – m∗1 = m
∗
3 ≈ −0.166. However, with systemic risk weight, the contribution of
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the first two overcomes the third one for high correlation, as emphasised in red in Table 2. These results
illustrate that the systemic risk weights correct the risk allocation as the correlation between the first two
risk components increases. The Monte Carlo scheme in this trivariate case is radically faster than Fourier,
(and Chebychev interpolation was not found useful in this case either), from 30 times up to 60 times more
efficient.
Fourier Method Monte Carlo 2 Mio
ρ m∗1 = m
∗
2 m
∗
3 R(X) TCP m
∗
1 = m
∗
2 m
∗
3 R(X) TCP
−0.9 -0.189 ≤ 0.096 -0.258 2 m 55 s -0.190 ≤ 0.095 -0.283 3159 ms
−0.5 -0.135 ≤ 0.016 -0.253 1 m 39 s -0.134 ≤ 0.017 -0.252 2799 ms
−0.2 -0.099 ≤ -0.030 -0.229 1 m 32 s -0.098 ≤ -0.030 -0.228 2760 ms
0 -0.076 ≤ -0.059 -0.212 2 m 22 s -0.077 ≤ -0.058 -0.212 3188 ms
0.2 -0.053 ≤ -0.086 -0.194 1 m 37 s -0.055 ≤ -0.086 -0.195 2741 ms
0.5 -0.020 ≥ -0.125 -0.165 1 m 47 s -0.020 ≥ -0.124 -0.164 3358 ms
0.9 0.025 ≥ -0.173 -0.121 2 m 07 s 0.026 ≥ -0.171 -0.119 2722 ms
Table 2: Trivariate case with systemic weight, that is α = 1. Computed by Fourier.
5.3. Higher Dimensions
Figure 4 show the variance-covariance matrix and the resulting risk allocation in a 30-variate case using
Monte Carlo, coupled with 15 node Chebychev interpolation when α = 1. Indeed, the dimension being
large, the preprocessing time with Monte-Carlo to compute the Chebychev coefficients together with the
computational time resulting from the root-finding with the polynom is lower than the raw Monte-Carlo
root finding. The plot shows that the risk allocation depends not only on the variance of the different risk
components, but also, in the case where α = 1, on the corresponding dependence structure. For instance,
compare components 28 and 29 in the 10-variate case in Figure 4. In the first case we observe that when
α = 0, component 28 contributes more than 29, and conversely when α = 1. The reason is that even if
component 28 has a slightly higher variance, it is relatively less correlated than 29 to the components 2,
3, 6, 20 and 23 that have the highest variance, and thus are the most ‘dangerous’ from the systemic point
of view. Hence, component 29 is more exposed than 28 in case of a systemic event.
6. Empirical Study: Default Fund Allocation
In the sequel we consider loss functions of the type
`1(x) =
∑
x+k −
1
2
∑
x−k (6.1)
`2(x) =
∑
x+k −
1
2
∑
x−k +
∑
k 6=j
(xk + xj)
+ − 1
2
∑
k 6=j
(xk + xj)
− (6.2)
The first loss function means that a position is acceptable if on average, the losses are compensated
by gains twice as large.6 In this case, the risk assessment of the losses is marginal or component-wise.
6The coefficient 1/2 is naturally subject to consensus and can be taken as any real number between 0 and 1.
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Figure 4: Plot showing the variance-covariance matrix together with the respective allocation in the 30-
variate case for α = 0, 1.
The second one is similar, however, it also aggregates pairwise losses and gains among the different
components. Here the risk assessment considers additionally the pairwise dependence between the losses.
Note that each of these loss function is positive homogeneous (hence so is R) and permutation invariant.
The default fund of a CCP is a protection against extreme and systemic risk. As of today, it is sized
according to the Cover 2 rule, see [26, article 42, §3, p. 37]. In a rough way, this corresponds to the
maximal joint loss of two members over their posted collateral (initial margin) in a stressed situation over
the last 60 days. The relative contribution of each member to the default fund is proportional to their
respective initial margin – that is, the value at risk at a given level of confidence of their loss and profit
over a three-day time horizon. Hence, denoting by DF the total size of the default fund and by IMk(Xk)
the initial margin of member k, the contribution of member k is given by
IMk(Xk)∑
j IMj(Xj)
DF (6.3)
As an alternative, we propose to define the contribution of member k to the default fund as follows.
According to theorem 3.5 there exists a unique optimal capital allocation RA(X) for a given loss vector
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X . We define therefore the relative risk contribution of each financial component as
RCk := RCk(X) =
RAk(X)∑
RAj(X)
=
RAk(X)
R(X)
. (6.4)
The value at risk for the initial margins IMk, the overall risk measure R as well as the optimal capital
allocation are all positive homogeneous. It follows that RCk(λX) = RCk(X) for every λ > 0, that
is, the relative risk contribution is scaling invariant as for instance the Sharpe ratio, Minmax ratio or
Gini ratio among others, see Cheridito and Kromer [17]. The scaling invariance property allows one to
consider the allocation independently of the total size of the default fund. The contribution of member k
is then given as
RCk ×DF (6.5)
The current practice based on the ratio of initial margins (6.3) provides an allocation that only depends
on the marginal risk of each member profit and loss Xk, and does not take their joint dependence into
account, that is, the systemic risk component. By contrast, the approach (6.5) allows one to take this
systemic risk component into account in the allocation of the default fund in the sense of the following
proposition already discussed in Section 4.
6.1. Data
In this section we compare a standard IM based allocation of the default fund of a CCP with the mul-
tivariate shortfall risk allocation resulting from the use of the loss functions `1 and `2. This empirical
study is based on an LCH real dataset corresponding to the clearing of 74 portfolios of equity derivatives
bearing on 90 underlyings. The clearing members have been anonymized and are referenced in the sequel
by labels starting by PB plus number (e.g. PB7), whereas the underlying assets are identified by their
real tickers, such as FCE for CAC40 index future and AEX for Amsterdam exchange index, which can
all be retrieved online. The Jupyter notebook corresponding to this empirical study, including all the data
and numerical codes, is publically available at https://github.com/yarmenti/MSRA. In order to avoid the
repricing of the options, all the derivative positions have been linearized and reformulated in equivalent
Delta positions in their underlyings. We denote by P the 74×90 matrix of the positions of the 74 clearing
members in the 90 underlyings. As the CCP clears, each column of P sums up to zero. The vector of the
clearing member losses at a three day (3d) horizon is given by
X = −P × (S3d − S0), (6.6)
where S is the vector of the underlying price processes. The vector S0 is observed and the vector S3d is
simulated in a Student’s t model estimated by maximum-likelihood on the underlying return time series,
i.e.
Si3d − Si0 ∼ κi × T νii × Si0, (6.7)
where T νii is a Student’s t random variable with νi degrees of freedom and where κi a calibration fudge
coefficient. The dependence between the underlyings is modeled by a Student’s t copula with correlation
matrix ρ and ν degrees of freedom, that is
Cρ,ν(u1, . . . , un) = F
ν
ρ
(
F−1ν (u1), . . . , F
−1
ν (un)
)
Here F νρ is the cumulative distribution function of the multivariate Student’s t distribution with correlation
matrix ρ and ν degrees of freedom, and Fν is the Student’s t cdf with ν degrees of freedom.
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6.2. Simulations
The correlation matrix ρ is estimated empirically on the return time series and the dependence copula
parameter is set to ν = 6. Each of m = 105 realizations of S3d, hence of the loss vector X , is simulated
as follows:
1. Simulate a Gaussian random vector G of size 90 with zero-mean and correlation ρ
2. Generate a χ2 random variable ξ with parameter ν
3. Obtain the Student’s t vector R =
√
ν
ξG
4. Transform R into uniform coordinates by Ui = Fν
(
Ri
)
and compute T νii = F
−1
νi
(
Ui
)
5. Compute S3d by (6.7) and X by (6.6)
The resulting inputs to the allocation optimization problem are analysed in Appendix C. Figure 5 shows
the correlation matrices of the underlying assets and of the loss vector X of the clearing members, in
a heatmap representation. In the left panel, which is directly estimated from the data, we see that the
underlying assets are all positively correlated, as commonly found in the case of equity derivatives. How-
ever, due to positions in opposite directions taken by the clearing members, some of their losses exhibit
significant negative correlations, as shown by the blue cells in the right panel.
Figure 5: Left: Correlation matrix of the underlying assets (ranked by alphabetical order of asset ticker;
one ticker out of ten is displayed along the coordinate axes). Right: Correlation matrix of the
loss vectorX of the clearing members (ranked by alphabetical order of member label; one label
out of ten is displayed along the coordinate axes).
6.3. Allocation Results
The total size of the default fund as of a standard Cover 2 methodology are shown in Table 3, for three
values of the dependence copula parameter ν and for 99% vs. 99.7% initial margins (IM). Since a Cover
2 default fund is a cushion over IM, its size is directly responsive to the level of the quantile which is used
for setting the IM (compare the two lines in Table 3). In relative terms the size of the default fund is quite
stable with respect to ν. However we emphasize that these are monetary amounts, so that the difference
between for instance 6.16 108 and 6.72 108 corresponds to 0.56 108, i.e. more than half a billion of the
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ν = 2 ν = 6 ν = 50
99 % IM 6.16 108 6.72 108 6.27 108
99.7 % IM 4.96 108 5.48 108 5.00 108
Table 3: Size of a Cover 2 default fund for different levels of initial margins and different values of the
dependence copula parameter ν.
corresponding currency. In the sequel we set ν = 6, which corresponds to an intermediate level of tail
dependence, and we use 99% IM, which corresponds to the EMIR regulatory floor on initial margins.
Figure 6 compares the allocation weights implied by the loss function `1 with the ones implied by
99% IM. The allocations are very similar, as confirmed by the examination of the percentage relative
differences displayed in the upper panels of Figure 6. By contrast, the lower panels of Figure 7 show that
the allocation weights implied by the loss function `1 and the dependence sensitive loss function `2 differ
significantly in relative terms, including for the names with the greatest contributions to the default fund.
These results illustrate the impact of the use of a “systemic” loss function on the allocation of the default
fund.
Figure 6: Left: Decreasing log-allocation weights implied by the loss function `1 (top) and 99% IM (bot-
tom). Right: Twelve highest allocation weights implied by the loss function `1 (top) and by 99%
IM (bottom), with the corresponding member labels.
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Figure 7: Left: Percentage relative differences between the allocation weights implied by the loss function
`1 and 99%IM (top), the loss function `2 and 99% IM (middle), and the loss functions `1 and
`2 (bottom), ranked by decreasing values of the allocation weights implied by the loss function
`1. Right: Zoom on the left parts of the graphs, with member labels.
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A. Some Classical Facts in Convex Optimization
For an extended real valued function f on a locally convex topological vector space X , its convex conju-
gate is defined as
f∗(x∗) = sup
x∈X
{〈x∗, x〉 − f(x)} , x∗ ∈ X∗,
where X∗ is the topological dual of X . The Fenchel–Moreau theorem states that if f is lower semi-
continuous, convex and proper, then so is f∗, and it holds
f(x) = f∗∗(x) = sup
x∗∈X∗
{〈x∗, x〉 − f∗(x∗)} , x ∈ X.
Following Rockafellar [42], for any non-empty set C ⊆ Rd, we define its recession cone
0+C :=
{
y ∈ Rd : x+ λy ∈ C for every x ∈ C and λ ∈ R+
}
.
By [42, Theorem 8.3], if C is non-empty, closed and convex, then
0+C =
{
y ∈ Rd : there exists x ∈ C such that x+ λy ∈ C for every λ ∈ R+
}
. (A.1)
By [42, Theorem 8.4], a non-empty, closed and convex set C is compact if and only if 0+C = {0}.
Given a proper, convex and lower semi-continuous function f on Rd, we call y ∈ Rd a direction of
recession of f if there exists x ∈ dom(f) such that the map λ 7→ f(x + λy) is decreasing on R+. We
denote by f0+ the recession function of f , that is, the function with epigraph given as the recession cone
of the epigraph of f , and we call
0+f :=
{
y ∈ Rd : (f0+)(y) ≤ 0}
the recession cone of f . The following theorem gathers results from [42, Theorems 8.5, 8.6, 8.7 and
Corollaries pp. 66–70].
Theorem A.1. Let f be a proper, closed and convex function on Rd.
1. Given x, y in Rd, if lim infλ→∞ f(x+ λy) <∞, then λ 7→ f(x+ λy) is decreasing.
2. All the non-empty level sets B := {x ∈ Rd : f(x) ≤ γ} 6= ∅ of f have the same recession cone,
namely the recession cone of f . That is:
0+f = 0+B, for every γ ∈ R such that B 6= ∅.
3. f0+ is a positively homogeneous, proper, closed and convex function, such that
(f0+)(y) = sup
λ>0
f(x+ λy)− f(x)
λ
= lim
λ→∞
f(x+ λy)− f(x)
λ
, y ∈ Rd,
for every x ∈ dom(f).
4. There exists x ∈ dom(f) such that the map λ 7→ f(x + λy) is decreasing on R+, that is, y is a
direction of recession of f , if and only if this map is decreasing for every x ∈ dom(f), which in
turn is equivalent to (f0+)(y) ≤ 0.
5. The map λ 7→ f(x+ λy) is constant on R+ for every x ∈ dom(f) if and only if (f0+)(y) ≤ 0 and
(f0+)(−y) ≤ 0.
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B. Multivariate Orlicz Spaces
In this appendix we briefly sketch how the classical theory of univariate Orlicz spaces carries over to the
d-variate case without any significant change. We follow the lecture notes by Léonard [40], only providing
the proofs that differ structurally from the univariate case.
A function θ : Rd → [0,∞] is called a Young function if it is
• convex and lower semi-continuous;
• such that θ(x) = θ(|x|) and θ(0) = 0;
• non trivial, that is, dom(θ) contains a neighborhood of 0 and θ(x) ≥ a ‖x‖ − b for some a > 0.
In particular, θ achieves its minimum at 0 and is increasing on Rd+. It is said to be finite if dom(θ) = Rd
and strict if limx→∞ θ(x)/ ‖x‖ =∞.
Lemma B.1. The function θ is Young if and only if θ∗ is Young. Furthermore, θ is strict if and only if θ∗
is strict if and only if θ and θ∗ are both finite.
Proof. This follows by application of the Fenchel-Moreau theorem and from the relation x · y ≤ θ(x) +
θ∗(y). 
For X ∈ L0, the Luxembourg norm of X is given as
‖X‖θ = inf {λ ∈ R : λ > 0 and E [θ (X/λ)] ≤ 1} ,
where inf ∅ =∞. The Orlicz space and heart are respectively defined as
Lθ :=
{
X ∈ L0 : ‖X‖θ <∞
}
=
{
X ∈ L0 : E [θ (X/λ)] <∞ for some λ ∈ R, λ > 0}
Mθ :=
{
X ∈ L0 : E [θ (X/λ)] <∞ for all λ ∈ R, λ > 0} .
Lemma B.2. 1. We have ‖X‖θ = 0 if and only if X = 0.
2. If 0 < ‖X‖θ < ∞, then E[θ(X/ ‖X‖θ)] ≤ 1. In particular, B := {X : ‖X‖θ ≤ 1} =
{X : E[θ(X)] ≤ 1}.
3. The gauge ‖·‖θ is a norm both on the Orlicz space Lθ and on the Orlicz heart Mθ.
4. The following Hölder Inequality holds:
E [|X · Y |] ≤ ‖X‖θ ‖Y ‖θ∗ .
5. Lθ is continuously embedded into L1, the space of integrable random variables on Ω× {1, . . . , d}
for the product measure P ⊗ Unif{1,...,d}. 7
6. The normed spaces (Lθ, ‖·‖θ) and (Mθ, ‖·‖θ) are Banach spaces.
Proof. These results can be established along the same lines as in the univariate case [See 40, Lemmas
1.8 and 1.10 and Propositions 1.11, 1.14, 1.15 and 1.18], using the Fenchel-Moreau Theorem in Rd+. 
Theorem B.3. If θ is finite, then the topological dual of Mθ is Lθ
∗
.
Proof. Again, the proof follows the univariate case [see 40, Proposition 1.20, Theorem 2.2 and Lemmas
2.4 and 2.5]. 
7The case where Lθ = L1 corresponds to θ(x) =
∑ |xk|.
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C. Data Analysis
Figure 8 shows the gross positions (sum of the absolute values of the positions in the underlying asset) per
clearing member. Four members concentrate particularly high positions in the CCP. Figure 9 shows the
gross positions of the CCP per underlying asset (top) and the corresponding underlying asset values (bot-
tom). The largest investment by far of the clearing members is in the asset with ticker FCE (CAC40 index
future, with spot value 4463), by a factor about three to the second one AEX (Amsterdam exchange index,
with spot value 443.83). The investments of the clearing members in the other assets are comparatively
much smaller.
Figure 10 shows the signed positions in the underlying assets of the twelve clearing members with the
largest gross positions (left) and the signed positions of the clearing members in the nine most traded
underlying assets (right), in a heatmap representation. In particular, we observe from the left panel that
the biggest players in the CCP, namely the members labeled PB7, PB56, PB59 and PB50, have opposite
sign positions in the main asset (the one with ticker FCE). The right panel shows that the dominant asset
position in the CCP, i.e. the one in FCE, is shared (with opposite signs) between a significant number of
clearing members. Figure 11 shows the annualized volatilities κi ×
√
νi
νi−2 ×
√
250
3 of the underlying
assets (cf. (6.7)). Most of these volatilities are comprised between 15% and 40%, with two assets, KBC
and TMS, spiking over 60% volatility. However, the clearing members are only very marginally invested
in these two assets (their tickers do not even appear in the right panel of Figure 9). Figure 12 shows the
monetary risks (3d volatilities × absolute monetary positions) in the underlying assets of the ten clearing
members with the largest gross positions. From the right panel we see that the FCE and AEX assets
(CAC40 index future FCE and Amsterdam exchange index AEX, two major indices) concentrate most of
the risk of the clearing members. The comparison with Figure 11 shows that this is not an effect of the
volatility of these assets, but of very large monetary positions of the clearing members.
Figure 8: Left: Gross positions per clearing member, ranked decreasing. Right: Zoom on the left part of
the graph with member labels.
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Figure 9: Top: Gross positions per underlying, ranked decreasing (left) and zoom on the left part of the
graph with tickers (right). Bottom: Spot values of the underlying assets, ranked as above (left)
and zoom on the left part of the graph with tickers (right).
Figure 10: Left: Positions in the underlying assets (one ticker out of ten displayed along the y axis) of the
ten clearing members with the largest gross positions, ranked by decreasing gross positions.
Right: Positions of the clearing members (one label out of ten displayed along the x axis) in
the three most invested-in underlying assets, ranked by asset gross positions of the CCP.
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Figure 11: Left: Underlying asset volatilities (ranked by decreasing order). Right: Zoom on the left part
of the graph with tickers.
Figure 12: Left: Log monetary risks in the underlying assets, ranked by decreasing risk order, of the
ten clearing members with the largest gross positions. Right: Monetary risks in the five most
invested-in underlying assets of the ten clearing members with the largest gross positions.
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